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IntroductIon
Active vision – orienting towards visual stimulation – has evolved over 
hundreds of millions of years. Even organisms as simple as nematodes 
or protozoa show phototaxis, that is, they move towards light sources. 
How is orienting brought about? Is awareness of the visual input (i.e., 
conscious vision) necessary for it? We do not know whether simple or-
ganisms, such as Nematodes, have faint precursors of awareness. Given 
that their nervous systems are not very complex, they probably orient 
without awareness and conscious vision. However, to date, only intro-
spective report taps into awareness, and we do not know how to assess 
awareness objectively so that we can tweak it in animals. Fortunately, 
the hypothesis of unconscious visual orienting can also be tested with 
humans. There are now numerous articles demonstrating orienting of 
attention without awareness (cf. McCormick, 1997; Scharlau, 2007). 
For example, McCormick (1997) presented his participants with the 
target of a reaction time task either to the left or to the right of the 
screen center. Participants did not know at which position the target 
was shown. Prior to the target, a brief cue appeared at one of the two 
possible target positions. As a consequence of the participants’ covertly 
orienting towards the cues, target responses were facilitated when cue 
and target appeared in the same position rather than in different po-
sitions. This was the case even though the participants remained un-
aware of the cue due to a low cue-background contrast.
Yet, what does it mean that humans can orient towards visual 
stimuli of which they remain unaware? Does it mean that unconscious 
orienting, as we will call this ability, is stimulus-driven or exogenous 
as McCormick concluded (see also Mulckhuyse & Theeuwes, 2010b)? 
Indeed, some unconscious mental processes can run off in a stimulus-
driven fashion. For these exogenous processes to run off, the human 
agent does not need to exert will. Think of a ray of light impinging on 
the retina. Via its photonic energy, the ray will start a cascade of events 
in an exogenous way, from transduction of light into nervous energy, 
up to phenomenal visual awareness. Even the strength of the sensory 
representations is governed by precise laws. Up to stimulus durations AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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of about 60 ms, luminance and duration of a visual stimulus are inte-
grated in a linear fashion for lightness perception (Bloch, 1885). As 
humans, we do not have anything to do to initiate these visual sensory 
processes but to literally let them happen.
Yet, caution is advised: The fact that exogenous processes can be 
unconscious does not necessarily mean that unconscious processes 
must be exogenous. Empirically, this has been shown to be particularly 
true of unconscious visual orienting (cf. Ansorge & Neumann, 2005; 
Woodman & Luck, 2003), that is, the selection of one spatial position 
from the environment.
Orienting as defined by spatial selection can be testified in one of 
two ways. First, it can be reflected in behavioral preferences for one 
position over the other, for instance, when the eyes turn toward one 
particular position in space (Posner, 1980). Second, it can show up in 
perceptual performance changes, in the form of a boosted detection, 
discrimination, or identification of stimuli at one particular position in 
space (Posner, 1980). In the latter case, it is not necessary that the eyes 
move towards the position. It is sufficient to covertly shift attention 
(Helmholtz, 1895, 1896).
In our review below we will discuss two ways of unconscious ori-
enting. One way is endogenous (Ansorge, Kiss, & Eimer, 2009). It starts 
with the selection of one visual feature and proceeds with the selection 
of the location of this feature. This way of orienting is endogenous or 
top-down controlled because initially participants intentionally set up 
the feature templates by which they search for task-relevant stimuli. 
Only visual stimuli that match these templates do then attract atten-
tion and lead to orienting. The other way is exogenous. It starts with 
a feature-unspecific selection of one visual location and proceeds with 
the selection of visual features from this location (McCormick, 1997; 
Mulckhuyse & Theeuwes, 2010b).
In  the  present  review,  we  focus  primarily  on  backward  mask-
ing  research.  Backward  masking  is  a  powerful  method  to  reduce 
stimulus  visibility  (cf.  Breitmeyer,  1984).  If  two  brief  visual  stim-
uli are successively presented at  the same or adjacent positions but 
with a short interval of about 30-100 ms between them, the first of 
these  stimuli  –  henceforth  the  “prime”  –  suffers  from  masking  by 
the second stimulus – henceforth the “mask”: Some of the prime’s 
features (i.e., its shape and its color) can barely be seen (cf. Alpern, 
1953; Breitmeyer, 1984; Breitmeyer & Ogmen, 2006; Reeves, 1981; 
Stigler, 1910). 
The major advantage of the method of masking is that it can be 
used  in  healthy  volunteers  to  study  unconscious  vision.  Besides 
reviewing masking studies, we will also occasionally refer to studies 
using  alternative  methods  to  prevent  conscious  vision  and  secure 
unconscious vision in healthy participants (e.g., McCormick, 1997; 
Mulckhuyse,  Talsma,  &  Theeuwes,  2007).  With  very  few  excep-
tions (e.g., Goodale & Milner, 1992; Weiskrantz, 1986), however, we 
will not systematically review studies with patients with neuropsy-
chological  impairments  of  conscious  vision,  because  of  the  uncer-
tainties  associated  with  this  kind  of  evidence,  like  substitution  of 
impaired processing routes by alternative processing mechanisms in 
patients.
What Is the functIon of orIentIng?
A vast amount of research suggests that one major function of orient-
ing is the facilitation of perception of visual information at the selected 
position  (e.g.,  Posner,  1980;  Titchener,  1908;  Treisman  &  Gelade, 
1980). In the typical experiment, one of several relevant visual target 
stimuli is presented at one of several spatial positions. Participants 
neither know at which position the next target will be shown, nor do 
they know the target’s exact identity. In this situation, prior orienting of 
the participants towards one of the potential target positions improves 
the participants’ accuracy of discriminating a target at this location and 
their speed of responding to it (e.g., Jonides, 1981; Müller & Rabbitt, 
1989; Yantis, 1988, 1993; Yantis & Jonides, 1984). For instance, target 
discrimination is better when a small cue is presented shortly before 
target onset and at the same position (SP) as the target than when the 
cue indicates a different position (DP) than the target (e.g., Jonides, 
1981).
hoW Is orIentIng carrIed out?
Orienting before feature selection 
Abrupt onset singletons
How is orienting carried out? One possibility is that visual orient-
ing proceeds as, first, an exogenously-driven selection of a position 
and, second, a subsequent selection of visual features from this posi-
tion. Three exogenous principles have been advocated for the initiation 
of orienting. One principle is exogenous or stimulus-driven orienting 
towards onset singletons (Breitmeyer & Ganz, 1976; Jonides, 1981). An 
onset singleton is a single stimulus that newly appears at a particular 
point in time while other stimulus or background elements are station-
ary at the very same moment. Some researchers believed that onset 
singletons were of special relevance during evolution because the quick 
detection of a suddenly appearing object in the visual field allowed 
orienting so that subsequently feature and identity information about 
the onset stimulus could be evaluated (cf. Breitmeyer & Ganz, 1976). 
In this manner, the visual system would readily orient to a changing 
visual input as a source of potential harm, for example, to avoid being 
struck by a falling rock.
Indeed, participants can very quickly orient towards abrupt onset 
cues. Cueing effects of abrupt onset singleton cues, with better per-
formance in SP than DP conditions, require only very brief cue-target 
intervals of a few milliseconds (cf. Müller & Rabbitt, 1989; Nakayama 
& Mackeben, 1989). In addition, abrupt onset cueing is found for un-
informative cues where SP and DP conditions occur unpredictably, for 
instance, and cue and target position are uncorrelated or only weakly 
correlated (cf. Jonides, 1981; Lambert, Spencer, & Mohindra, 1987). In 
fact, participants even have problems ignoring an uninformative abrupt 
onset cue, if asked to do so (cf. Jonides, 1981; Remington, Johnston, & 
Yantis, 1992). In contrast to this, if a symbolic cue is presented – that 
is, a cue such as an arrow in the center of the screen pointing towards 
one peripheral target position, so that a feature, such as the cue’s shape, AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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must be used for orienting – participants need to have some confidence 
in the information value of the cue for predicting the target position, 
and participants need longer cue-target intervals to use the cue (e.g., 
Müller & Rabbitt, 1989). It therefore seems that abrupt onset singletons 
are special, exogenously capture attention and drive orienting, regard-
less of the goals of the participants.
singleton or sAlience-driven cApture
The second exogenous orienting principle that has been advocated 
generalizes this idea. Some authors assumed an orienting mechanism 
sensitive  to  singletons,  or  regions  of  high  local  feature  contrast  – 
that is, salient regions (cf. Bergen & Julesz, 1983; Itti & Koch, 2001; 
Theeuwes, 1992). This principle considers local visual feature contrasts 
in at least color, luminance, and orientation as crucial input for exog-
enous visual orienting. Exogenous orienting is instigated if the local 
feature contrast at one position is considerably stronger than feature 
contrasts at all alternative positions (e.g., Parkhurst, Law, & Niebur, 
2002). According to this view, an onset singleton driving attention is 
just a special case of stimulus-driven orienting by strong local feature 
contrasts.
This assumption is supported, for example, by the examination 
of eye fixation patterns. Fixations are the phases in which the gaze 
rests at a particular image location. Under free viewing of 2D im-
ages of natural scenes, fixations on regions with high local feature 
contrast  (i.e.,  singletons)  are  far  more  frequent  than  expected  on 
the basis of a chance distribution of all fixations (cf. Parkhurst et al., 
2002). Feature singletons or feature contrast maxima are also believed 
to help orienting towards interesting visual positions, such as object 
edges, for the subsequent selection of the particular identity of the vis-
ual features from these positions (cf. Mulckhuyse & Theeuwes, 2010b; 
Theeuwes, 2010). 
cApture by overleArned symbols 
Researchers argued for a third exogenous orienting principle by 
overlearned symbols, such as seen eye gaze direction (cf. Langton & 
Bruce, 1999), pointing directions of arrows (e.g. Eimer, 1997; Tipples, 
2002), and even spatial words, like left or right (cf. Hommel, Pratt, 
Colzato, & Godijn, 2001). It is assumed that humans have so much 
experience with the use of the spatial meaning of these stimuli for at-
tention shifts that these stimuli can trigger attention shifts without any 
prior intention on the side of the observer. In line with this assumption, 
if used as cues, all of these stimuli trigger attention shifts even if they 
are irrelevant and completely uncorrelated with the position of a rel-
evant target stimulus (Eimer, 1997; Friesen & Kingston, 1998; Hommel 
et al., 2001).
mAsking 
The sequence of exogenous orienting preceding visual feature selec-
tion is also supported by masking research. Masking research suggests 
that conscious perception of visual features depends on prior orienting 
towards a visual stimulus. Prime features, such as prime shape and 
prime color, are lost for conscious perception if a mask substitutes the 
prime in the critical time window between prime onset and the conclu-
sion of orienting towards the prime (cf. Bachmann, 1999; Enns, 2004; 
Neumann & Scharlau, 2007a, 2007b).
In line with the assumption that the crucial mediating variable 
here is the time to shift attention to the prime, masking of visual prime 
features, such as its color or shape, becomes weaker for primes (and 
masks) inside the focus of attention (cf. Bridgeman & Leff, 1979; Enns, 
2004). Also, in line with the assumption that abrupt onsets are special 
in that they are available before additional features of the same stimulus 
can be selected, the prime’s temporal onset and its spatial position are 
usually spared from masking (cf. Bachmann, 1999; Fehrer & Raab, 
1962; Schiller & Chorover, 1966).
This  temporal  onset  sparing  is  reflected  in  perceptual  latency 
priming  (Bachmann,  1999;  Scharlau,  2007;  Scharlau  &  Neumann, 
2003a, 2003b). When a primed mask and a similar unprimed stimulus 
are presented in perfect synchrony, humans often see a sequence of 
events: The primed mask is seen as temporally preceding the unprimed 
stimulus.  This  perception  even  arises  if  the  primed  mask  actually 
trails the other stimulus by a short amount of time (Scharlau, 2007). 
This is due to prior entry (cf. Titchener, 1908): Orienting towards the 
prime saves the time of the otherwise necessary orienting towards 
the subsequent mask. The time that is saved to see the primed mask 
(i.e., the amount of perceptual latency priming) is proportional to the 
prime-mask interval up to the time which is needed for the comple-
tion of the attention shift towards the mask (above this, the effect 
slowly declines to small values; cf. Scharlau, Ansorge, & Horstmann, 
2006).  Hence,  information  about  prime  onset  time  survives 
masking.
Spatial  onset  sparing  is  also  reflected  in  perceptual  latency 
priming  (Scharlau,  2004b).  The  comparison  stimulus  does  not 
benefit from a prime at a different position, and perceptual latency 
priming can show up at two separate, primed locations, but stimuli 
at positions in between two primed locations, will not benefit from 
perceptual  latency  priming  (Scharlau  2004a).  This  indicates  that 
both the information about the prime position and its onset time 
are  available  despite  the  masking  of  the  prime,  and  that  prime 
onset  and  prime  position  jointly  account  for  perceptual  latency 
priming. 
conclusion 
Cueing research, fixation behavior, and masking research suggest 
that humans select information about an abruptly onsetting visual 
stimulus’ position prior to the conscious perception of some other 
features of this stimulus. In addition, masking research indicated that 
orienting could be a crucial prerequisite of the conscious perception of 
additional features of a prime stimulus, such as its color or its shape. 
We will next review, however, that dissociations between feature vis-
ibility and feature selection suggest that features, such as prime color 
and prime shape, can also be selected prior to conscious perception and 
prior to orienting proper and that therefore the exogenous-orienting 
mechanisms of abrupt-onset capture and singleton capture have been 
called into question.AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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Visual feature selection before 
orienting
dissociAtions between feAture visibility           
And feAture selection 
Numerous masked-priming studies have demonstrated that the 
visual features of a masked prime, such as its precise shape or its color, 
are selected before orienting has been completed. Even if participants 
do not complete orienting towards a prime before mask onset and the 
prime is hence not seen, prime shape and prime color can influence 
endogenously  controlled  behavior  (e.g.,  Neumann  &  Klotz,  1994). 
The corresponding evidence takes the form of dissociations between 
feature selection and feature visibility. These dissociations shed light 
on the sequence of events during orienting. In light of these dissocia-
tions, it is a theoretical possibility (to be evaluated further below) that 
the sequence of events in orienting is reverse to the usually assumed 
sequence where orienting obligatorily leads feature selection, and that 
actually feature selection can precede orienting and that orienting can 
in fact even be conditional on feature selection, during both conscious 
and unconscious orienting.
Many studies showed that masked prime features are selected prior 
to their conscious perception and, hence, prior to the completion of 
orienting towards these primes.1 For instance, in a masked-priming 
study, Neumann and Klotz (1994) demonstrated that different prime 
shapes were selected and triggered their associated responses, even 
if these prime shapes were so strongly masked as to be completely 
blocked from conscious perception. Neumann and Klotz presented as 
targets a square on the left and a diamond on the right, or a square on 
the right and a diamond on the left. Their participants had to respond 
to the position of the square. They had to press a right key if the square 
was on the right and a left key if the square was on the left. In the same 
conditions, the target and the distractor were also used as masks for 
primes that were presented just prior to the target and distractor. The 
prime pair also consisted of a square and a diamond but of smaller size, 
such that the primes were backward-masked by the surrounding mask 
contours. In congruent conditions, the square-shaped prime and target 
were presented at the same position. For instance, the prime square 
was presented on the right and so was the target square. In incongru-
ent conditions, the prime square was presented on the opposite side of 
the target. For instance, the prime square was presented on the right 
but the target square was shown on the left. Under these conditions, 
responses were faster in congruent than incongruent conditions. This 
was observed although the prime could not be seen as demonstrated in 
separated prime detection tasks. 
This basic dissociation between zero prime shape visibility – as a 
consequence of a lack of orienting – and prime shape selection – as 
concluded from the congruence effect of the prime – means that feature 
selection (here shape selection) is evidently a predecessor of orienting. 
This dissociation has been replicated many times (cf. Ansorge, Klotz,& 
Neumann, 1998; Klotz & Neumann, 1999; Klotz & Wolff, 1995), with 
different shapes, in different laboratories (cf. Eimer & Schlaghecken, 
1998; Enns & Di Lollo, 1997; Jaśkowski, van der Lubbe, Schlotterbeck, 
& Verleger , 2002; Leuthold & Kopp, 1998; Vorberg, Mattler,  Heinecke, 
Schmidt, & Schwarzbach, 2004; Woodman & Luck, 2003), and with a 
feature different from shape (e.g., color; Ansorge, Becker, & Breitmeyer, 
2009; Ansorge, Breitmeyer, & Becker, 2007; Breitmeyer, Ogmen, & 
Chen, 2004; Breitmeyer, Ro, & Singhal, 2004; Schmidt, 2002; Vath & 
Schmidt, 2007). Unconscious visual feature selection of successfully 
masked stimuli provides a strong argument for the temporal prece-
dence of feature selection over the completion of orienting.
Is orIentIng condItIonal on vIsual 
feature selectIon?
Going one step further, the strongest arguments for a temporal pre-
cedence of feature selection over orienting came from studies showing 
that orienting is even conditional on prior feature selection. A test of 
this sequence requires fulfillment of three conditions, as these were 
paradigmatically defined in so-called contingent capture experiments 
(Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 1992). Contingent capture of attention 
denotes a form of orienting that is conditional on a match between 
top-down controlled templates for relevant visual features and actually 
selected visual features of an input stimulus. According to this concept, 
only stimuli with a feature matching to the search template elicit orient-
ing towards their position. It is clear that the very concept of contingent 
capture requires that features, such as color or shape of a stimulus, can 
be selected prior to orienting towards this stimulus. 
The first of the three conditions that needs to be fulfilled to demon-
strate contingent capture is that the researcher has to have a motivated 
hypothesis about the content of the search templates used by the par-
ticipants. This is usually ensured by the task and the instructions. The 
researcher can ask participants to search for a class of targets defined by 
a particular feature. For instance, the researcher can inform the partici-
pants that the only red stimulus in the display is the target. In addition, 
the researcher can take more or less care that the participants can only 
find the target by the particular instructed feature. If less care is taken 
and the target can be found by more than one of its characteristics 
(e.g., if it can also be found as the only circular stimulus in the display), 
the researcher’s assumptions about the content of the search template 
could be wrong, and search templates could vary across participants or 
time. (An important side condition for contingent capture experiments 
is thus again the participants’ uncertainty about the target position.) 
The second and the third condition to be met pertain to the use 
of two sorts of irrelevant cues (or distractors): cues with a template-
matching feature (the “matching cues”) and cues without a template-
matching feature (the “non-matching cues”). Importantly, these cues 
must be fully irrelevant for the task. In particular, the cues should not 
inform about the likely target position, because otherwise participants 
have good reasons to search intentionally for the cues in addition to 
their intentional search for the relevant targets. Intentional search for 
the cues is usually disencouraged by ensuring that the positions of the 
cues and the positions of the targets are uncorrelated across trials or by 
using a number of different possible target positions larger than two 
and by never presenting the cue at the target’s position. To demonstrate 
contingent capture, it then needs to be shown that participants do ori-AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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ent towards the matching cue but not towards the non-matching cue. 
This result would confirm that the search template for a target feature, 
say its color, is also a necessary precondition of the capture by the 
matching cue which happens to have the same searched-for feature, 
say a particular color.
In their ground-breaking study, Folk et al. (1992) turned a crucial 
but untested premise of some stimulus-driven research approaches (cf. 
Mulckhuyse & Theeuwes, 2010b) into a hypothesis stating that orient-
ing could be feature-specific rather than feature-unspecific (i.e., rather 
than be driven by abrupt onsets or by any singleton). Folk et al. (1992) 
tested whether participants could use visual features, such as stimulus 
color, to carefully select only stimuli that were probably targets. They 
used two kinds of defining target features that their participants had 
to search for in different blocks. In one block, the targets were defined 
by a particular color (i.e., red) and as a color singleton (i.e., the other 
elements of the target display were white). In an alternative block, the 
targets were defined by their status as an abrupt-onset singleton. The 
participants’ task was to search for the target by these pre-specified 
features and to report the target’s shape.
The reasonably well motivated hypothesis of Folk et al. (1992) con-
cerning the content of the search templates was that participants either 
searched for a color target (in the blocks in which all targets were red) 
or for an abrupt-onset target (in the blocks in which all targets were 
abrupt-onset singletons). In each of the blocked conditions, Folk et al. 
used matching cues (a red cue presented shortly before a red target, 
or a white onset-singleton cue presented shortly before a white onset-
singleton target) and non-matching cues (a red cue presented shortly 
before a white onset-singleton target, or a white onset-singleton cue 
presented shortly before a red target). Cues as well as targets were pre-
sented with equal probabilities at each of four locations, with cue and 
target locations uncorrelated across trials.
The predictions of the contingent capture view and, hence, the 
assumption that feature selection precedes orienting, were fully con-
firmed. A matching cue at the same position (SP) as the target facili-
tated the search for the target and the correct responses to it. This was 
in comparison to a matching cue at a different position (DP) than the 
target. A non-matching cue, however, led to about the same search 
time and response speed in SP and DP conditions. Folk et al. (1992) 
concluded that orienting was conditional (or contingent) on feature 
coding and a match between stimulus features and search templates, 
although some instances of bottom-up capture seem to require yet 
another explanation than contingent capture (cf. Burnham & Neely, 
2008).
Conclusion: Neither abrupt-onset singletons, nor color singletons 
were special in their status as exogenously summoning attentional 
capture. Both singleton effects were over-ruled by feature-contingent 
orienting (see also Ansorge & Heumann, 2003, 2004; Ansorge, Kiss, 
Worschech, & Eimer, 2011; Folk & Remington, 1998; for a review, 
see Burnham, 2007). Subsequent research additionally showed that 
endogenous control principles can also account for singleton capture. 
Bacon and Egeth (1994) showed that participants endogenously search 
for singletons in general (i.e., stimuli that differ in any of their features 
from  their  surrounds)  if  such  an  endogenously  controlled  search 
template allows finding all targets, but that participants switch to an 
endogenous feature-search mode if the targets are non-singletons. This 
means that Folk et al. (1992) tested their feature-contingent orienting 
hypothesis under very conservative conditions, because endogenous 
search for singletons was also possible in Folk et al. (1992). This also 
means that one cannot simply infer a general precedence of exogenous 
orienting over feature selection from evidence for singleton capture 
(Leber & Egeth, 2006). Below it will be explained that this is crucial 
for an appropriate understanding of what happens during unconscious 
orienting.
Deallocation
There is a caveat to the argument of Folk et al. (1992). It could be that 
failures to reveal orienting by non-matching cues are due to fast orient-
ing, followed by fast reorienting.  On this account, participants oriented 
towards both, the matching and the non-matching cue (cf. Mulckhuyse 
& Theeuwes, 2010b; Theeuwes, Atchley, & Kramer, 2000). Thereafter, 
however, participants could have used the small interval between cue 
and target for a quick deallocation from the non-matching cue, reason-
ably ahead of the presentation of the target. As a consequence, zero 
orienting towards the non-matching cue would have been falsely sug-
gested by the lack of a cueing effect only because orienting had already 
reverted to a neutral position (equally distant from all potential target 
positions). In addition, in the matching condition, a high cue-target 
similarity might have required more time to discriminate the cue from 
the very similar target before the cue could be rejected as irrelevant. As 
a consequence, participants would not have deallocated their attention 
in the matching condition at the time when the target had its onset. 
Therefore, orienting (as a cueing effect) was found in the matching 
condition only.
Some authors claim to have found positive evidence for dealloca-
tion and/or exogenous orienting. Belopolsky, Schreij, and Theeuwes 
(2010) reported that their participants oriented towards uninformative 
non-matching color cues. True, this finding is at odds with that of Folk 
et al. (1992). The study of Belopolsky et al., however, does not neces-
sarily demonstrate exogenous orienting. Participants could well have 
endogenously searched for all targets as singletons. We have explained 
this in more detail above. There is also no evidence that participants 
oriented towards the uninformative non-matching cue early after its 
onset. The effect of the non-matching cue could have also occurred at 
a later time after the cue’s onset.
Another study by Schreij, Owens, and Theeuwes (2008) is also 
equivocal in this respect: In that study, adding one placeholder element 
in the target displays in the Folk et al. (1992) paradigm increased search 
times. Schreij et al. regard this as evidence that the new element must 
have captured attention. Yet, it is a standard finding in the visual search 
literature that additional stimuli in the display increase search time 
(cf. Duncan & Humphreys, 1989; Treisman & Gelade, 1982; Wolfe, 
1994). Maybe Schreij et al. think it is noteworthy that an additional 
placeholder increased search time although the participants oriented 
towards the matching cues. This line of thinking, however, presupposes AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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that the matching cues attracted attention in a deterministic manner, 
in all trials, and to a maximal extent. If, however, orienting towards the 
matching cue shows variability as is typical for almost all mental proc-
esses, and if orienting effects were therefore less than maximal, there 
would have been ample air for an additional delay of the target search 
time imposed by one more placeholder in the target display.
Data by Pratt and McAuliffe (2002) are perfectly in line with this 
suspicion. These authors showed that orienting towards a matching 
cue is less than optimal at the time of the targets because with time 
(during the cue-target interval) participants withdraw attention even 
from the matching cues (cf. Posner & Cohen, 1984). Accordingly, an 
additional placeholder could well have delayed search times despite of 
overall net orienting to the matching cues in Schreij et al.’s study.
exhAustive meAsures of feAture-dependent 
orienting 
What is needed to test the possibility of deallocation is an exhaustive 
measure of orienting. One has to continuously track orienting during a 
trial and right from stimulus onset onwards to find out whether feature-
independent (singleton-driven) orienting precedes feature-dependent 
orienting. Continuous tracking of orienting towards a stimulus, from 
its onset and with millisecond resolution is possible with event-related 
potentials (ERPs). ERPs should therefore be sensitive to initial exog-
enous orienting, if it exists. When ERP measures do not respond to 
non-matching singleton cues but only to matching singleton cues, the 
hypothesis that exogenous orienting (mandatorily) precedes feature 
coding and is just camouflaged by deallocation is weakened.
Noteworthy, the large majority of ERP studies failed to find any 
evidence whatsoever for early exogenous orienting with non-matching 
cues (cf. Eimer & Kiss, 2008; Eimer, Kiss, Press, & Sauter, 2009; Kiss, 
Jolicoeur, Dell’Acqua, & Eimer, 2008). Instead in one study, feature-
dependent orienting in ERPs was found even within 100 ms after cue 
onsets (Zhang & Luck, 2009). 
In  addition,  Ansorge  et  al.  (2011)  used  ERPs  as  an  exhaustive 
measure to test whether exogenous orienting towards non-matching 
cues can be as strong as feature-specific top-down contingent orient-
ing if there is no incentive to deallocate attention away from the cues. 
For that purpose, Ansorge et al. (2011) presented top-down matching 
singleton color cues as well as non-matching singleton color cues at the 
target’s position in 100% of the trials. Under these 100% SP conditions, 
there was absolutely no incentive for the participants to withdraw at-
tention from any of the cues. If it would be true that faster deallocation 
after non-matching than matching cues falsely suggested more initial 
top-down contingent feature-specific orienting in prior studies, one 
would have expected no difference between the ERP orienting effects 
under the conditions with 100% SP cues. However as in other studies, 
top-down contingent feature-specific attentional capture was stronger 
than exogenous singleton capture. This result makes clear that stronger 
deallocation is not a plausible explanation for the results of the study 
of Folk et al. (1992).
Two other ERP studies appear to be in line with the deallocation ac-
count at a first glance. Hickey, McDonald, and Theeuwes (2006) found 
early orienting to a non-matching cue. In that study, however, the task 
does not disencourage an endogenous search for singletons. Ansorge 
and Heumann (2006) found early lateral ERP effects of non-matching 
unconscious cues. However, in their study, ERP effects are best ex-
plained by sensory differences rather than attentional effects because 
there was no behavioral orienting effect (Ansorge & Heumann, 2006). 
unconscIous orIentIng
How does orienting operate in the case of unconscious visual stimuli? 
Basically, the two options discussed above have also been studied with 
unconscious visual stimuli: exogenous orienting preceding feature se-
lection on the one hand, and endogenous feature-contingent orienting 
on the other.
Endogenous feature-contingent 
orienting towards unconscious 
stimuli
Several studies demonstrated endogenous feature-contingent orient-
ing towards unconscious visual stimuli. Ansorge and Neumann (2005) 
used black or red targets and found that their participants only oriented 
towards unconscious black primes, if they searched for black targets but 
not if they searched for red targets. Scharlau and Ansorge (2003) used 
matching singletons and non-matching singletons as masked primes, 
and demonstrated that perceptual latency priming was stronger with 
matching than with non-matching primes, although participants could 
have also searched for all targets by endogenous singleton search alone. 
Held, Ansorge, and Müller (2010) equally found that if participants 
searched for visible color singletons, participants oriented towards a 
masked color singleton prime whereas they did not orient towards a 
masked shape singleton prime. 
Again, we have to ask whether deallocation can be ruled out with a 
more exhaustive ERP measure. This was done by Woodman and Luck 
(2003; for related results, see also Jaśkowski et al., 2002). These authors 
found that if a masked matching stimulus and a masked non-matching 
stimulus were presented concomitantly, one left and the other right 
of  fixation,  participants  oriented  towards  the  matching  stimulus. 
A possible weakness of Woodman and Luck’s (2003) study is that it 
showed a net advantage in orienting for the matching cue over the non-
matching cue. Because the matching and the non-matching cues were 
pitted against one another, it is possible to overlook orienting towards 
the non-matching singleton in the net orienting effect created by both 
stimuli. Later studies to be discussed below (Ansorge, Horstmann, & 
Worschech, 2010), however, are not open to this criticism.
An alternative procedure to test orienting towards masked uncon-
scious color singletons was developed by Ansorge, Kiss, and Eimer 
(2009). These authors presented one masked matching non-singleton 
color prime per trial and found evidence for orienting. The effect was 
also found in the ERPs during so-called nogo trials. In the nogo trials, 
only a cue was shown and no color target was presented. The nogo 
trials therefore clearly demonstrated that the feature-specific top-down 
contingent orienting effect was produced by masked stimuli alone. AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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Importantly, evidence for orienting was found regardless of whether or 
not a target with the same color as the matching prime was presented 
to the participants in the trial before. This finding makes clear that en-
dogenous feature-dependent orienting explains the effect exclusively, 
with no contribution of bottom-up priming of pop-out as an alterna-
tive exogenous origin of the effect (cf. Belopolsky et al., 2010; Maljkovic 
& Nakayama, 1994).
Following up on orienting effects in ERPs of masked unconscious 
visual color cues (cf. Ansorge, Kiss, & Eimer, 2009), Ansorge et al. 
(2010) presented only one singleton cue per trial. In half of these trials, 
this was a matching cue and in half of the trials it was a non-matching 
cue.  Under  these  conditions,  orienting  towards  the  unconscious 
non-matching singleton would not be camouflaged by simultaneous 
orienting towards a matching singleton, as was discussed above with 
reference to Woodman and Luck (2003). Nonetheless, the conclusions 
of Woodman and Luck were fully supported. The only evidence for ori-
enting was found in ERPs towards masked matching color singletons. 
No such orienting was found towards non-matching color singletons. 
In addition, Ansorge et al. (2010) tested whether the orienting effect 
of masked matching cues is at least stronger if the cue is a singleton 
than if it is a non-singleton (cf. Lamy & Zoaris, 2009). However, no dif-
ference was found between the behavioral cueing effects in these two 
conditions – that is, the singleton status of the masked cues even failed 
to boost orienting towards these stimuli if they matched the top-down 
search sets by their particular feature. In other words, a feature-match 
was not only necessary for an orienting towards the masked color cues, 
it was also the only statistically reliable origin of orienting that could 
be found. 
The top-down contingency principle in attentional control also 
generalizes  to  overlearned  symbols.  Reus,  Pohl,  Kiesel,  and  Kunde 
(2011) used visible as well as masked arrows as cues. These authors 
found that visible arrows elicited attention shifts in target-predictive 
and non-predictive conditions. By contrast, masked cues only elicited 
attention shifts if the cues were also predictive of the likely target posi-
tions. According to the authors, the participants had to set up an inten-
tion to process the visible arrows for an attentional effect of the masked 
arrow cues. Only when an informative visible arrow cue was used but 
not when a non-predictive arrow cue was used, participants set up this 
intention. As a consequence of this intention, masked arrow cues that 
were presented in a sequence of trials randomly inter-mixed with the 
informative visible arrow cue led to an attention shift.
Exogenous orienting towards 
unconscious singletons
Other  authors  come  to  an  opposite  conclusion  and  claim  to  have 
demonstrated  exogenous  orienting  towards  unconscious  single-
tons  (e.g.,  Ivanoff  &  Klein,  2003;  McCormick,  1997;  Mulckhuyse 
&  Theeuwes,  2010a).  Among  the  most  convincing  demonstrations 
of exogenous orienting is the research by Mulckhuyse and her col-
leagues (e.g., Mulckhuyse et al., 2007). Yet even this research fails to 
convincingly  demonstrate  exogenous  orienting,  as  will  be  detailed 
below.
The basic paradigm has been developed in Mulckhuyse et al. (2007). 
These authors used placeholders at three different positions, and one 
of these placeholders started a little earlier than the others. This was 
the onset-singleton cue. Participants had difficulties discriminating 
which of the three placeholders was presented first and, therefore, the 
temporal onset-singleton cue was considered unconscious. After the 
cue and placeholders, an onset-singleton target appeared within one of 
the placeholders with the position of cue and target being uncorrelated 
over trials. With this setup, Mulckhuyse et al. (2007) found a cueing ef-
fect −better performance for SP conditions than DP conditions − with 
a brief cue-target interval.
From the above, however, it is clear that this study fulfills all cri-
teria necessary for contingent capture. The targets were onset single-
tons, and the masked cues were onset singletons. Thus, a search set 
for the relevant features can account for the orienting effects found by 
Mulckhuyse et al. (2007). No need to revert to an exogenous orienting 
effect. 
Speed of orienting in unconscious 
cueing 
Another criterion of exogenous unconscious orienting that has been 
advocated in the past is the speed of the orienting effect (Mulckhuyse 
& Theeuwes, 2010b). Above we have reviewed that quick orienting was 
sometimes considered to be typical of exogenous orienting (cf. Müller 
& Rabbitt, 1989; Ogawa & Komatsu, 2004). This speed criterion was 
used to argue that orienting towards unconscious onset cues during 
early phases of the saccadic trajectory must have been of an exogenous 
origin (cf. Van der Stigchel, Mulckhuyse, & Theeuwes, 2009).
Yet speed is an equivocal criterion of exogenous orienting because 
contingent capture as one form of endogenous feature-dependent ori-
enting is also fast (Bichot, Rossi, & Desimone, 2005; Zhang & Luck, 
2009). Endogenous orienting in the form of contingent capture effects 
can be found with simultaneous onsets of matching cues and targets, 
and the orienting effect is present among the quickest responses, when 
no exogenous orienting effect is observed (cf. Ansorge & Horstmann, 
2007; Ansorge, Horstmann, & Carbone, 2005). This means that exog-
enous unconscious orienting cannot be concluded by reverting to a 
speed criterion. The same conclusion is supported by the earlier onset 
of orienting effects in ERPs of top-down matching color cues than of 
non-matching singleton cues (cf. Ansorge et al., 2011).
summary and dIscussIon
In the present review, we have carefully summarized the general condi-
tions that must be fulfilled by an experimental protocol for demon-
strating endogenous orienting to visual stimuli, for exogenous orient-
ing, and for orienting to unconscious visual stimuli. We have shown 
that there is only one fail-safe criterion by which it can be concluded 
with certainty that an orienting effect reflects exogenous orienting: the 
absence of a fitting endogenous feature-specific search criterion as a 
precondition for an orienting effect (cf. Folk et al., 1992). We think that 
some studies that used conscious cues for orienting successfully pass AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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this criterion and thus support exogenous orienting (e.g., Burnham & 
Neely, 2008).
More importantly, however, our review of the major evidence in the 
domain of unconscious orienting has shown that endogenous orient-
ing is the rule in these studies and that exogenous orienting has not yet 
been demonstrated with unconscious stimuli. None of the studies that 
we reviewed fulfills the requirement of demonstrating unconscious 
orienting in the absence of a fitting search template. In the few studies 
where the relevance of a match between the unconscious stimulus and 
the search template was manipulated, the match between unconscious-
ly presented visual features and search set was found to be necessary 
for orienting (e.g., Woodman & Luck, 2003).
A few limitations of our review are noteworthy. We have not dis-
cussed work with patients. To our knowledge, however, the conclusion 
would be the same. Kristjánsson, Vuilleumier, Malhotra, Husain, and 
Driver (2005), for example, demonstrated in two patients with visual 
neglect of the right visual hemifield that an undetected singleton color 
presented to the neglected side in trial n exogenously primed orient-
ing towards a similar color stimulus in a subsequent trial n + 1. Note 
that this means that the unconscious singleton in trial n was chosen 
in accord with the patients’ top-down search template for a singleton. 
Likewise, patients with a scotoma in V1 who fail to report a visual 
stimulus in their blind field can orient towards the invisible stimuli, 
a  condition  termed  blindsight  (e.g.,  Weiskrantz,  1986;  Weiskrantz, 
Warrington, Sanders, & Marshall, 1974). Yet, these patients endog-
enously search for these stimuli in their blind field. Thus, again, we 
have good reason to consider these effects as a form of endogenous 
rather than exogenous orienting.
We have also not discussed the underlying physiological substrate 
of unconscious visual effects in the brain. We believe that a system 
encompassing the superior colliculus, posterior parietal cortex (PPC), 
and frontal eye fields could be part of that substrate (cf. Ansorge, 2003; 
Mulckhuyse & Theeuwes, 2010a; Weiskrantz, 1986). Where to finally 
put the origin of unconscious orienting in this network of intercon-
nected areas remains yet to be seen. However, we believe that PPC is a 
likely candidate for a role of unconscious vision in orienting because of 
PPC’s involvement during unconscious visually guided action control 
in general (cf. Goodale & Milner, 1992) and in the programming of 
saccades (e.g., Bueno & Andersen, 2006) and endogenous contingent 
orienting in particular (e.g., Ogawa & Komatsu, 2009).
Finally, the way that the studies reviewed in the present article meas-
ured visibility varied, and we have not weighed the reviewed evidence 
from the studies by the sophistication of the methods used to secure 
that the stimuli or features were truly unconscious (cf. Eriksen, 1960; 
Holender, 1986; Reingold & Merikle, 1988). We used a relatively liberal 
criterion for the inclusion of studies. This was done in the interest of a 
maximally encompassing review. Conclusions, however, would be no 
different with a more stringent criterion for unconscious presentation.
Conclusion
We have started with examples of very primitive organisms, such as 
nematodes that orient towards the source of light, probably without 
any awareness of the light or consciousness about it. We think that 
these primitive organisms provide good examples concerning the ori-
gin and ultimate function of unconscious orienting. During evolution, 
animal species predating humans had to develop more flexible sensori-
motor mechanisms in the service of coordinating their actions within 
a dynamically changing environment (cf. Allport, 1987; Brembs, 2011; 
Neumann, 1987). Orienting is just one of these sensorimotor mecha-
nisms. 
What is important in this context is that in order to be adaptive, 
these  orienting  mechanisms  should  be  endogenously  and  flexibly 
steerable and not only be exogenously driven by some enduring visual 
properties of the environment. To be adaptive an orienting mechanism 
has to be steerable by different visual features, depending on the kind of 
intended action to be executed and on the particular action goal pur-
sued. Under this perspective, orienting, as we see it, has become ever 
more endogenously controlled in animals and has been also a precur-
sor and building block of conscious vision both in evolutionary terms 
and in real-time (cf. Lamme, 2003). Endogenous orienting serves the 
purpose of highlighting relevant features and of down-weighting ir-
relevant features, either for action control or, in some species, for a 
conscious visual representation of the environment.
footnote
1 Attention and awareness can be dissociated: An observer’s atten-
tion can be directed to a stimulus, without a subsequent aware percep-
tion of this stimulus (cf. Lamme, 2003). Much of the evidence in this 
article concerns this fact (e.g., Ansorge, Kiss, & Eimer, 2009). However, 
the opposite pattern of dissociation is difficult to demonstrate and ac-
cordingly has not been demonstrated so far: awareness in the absence 
of attention.
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